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Fiduciary Duties: Directors and Employees (second edition) 
 
Andrew Stafford QC and Stuart Ritchie QC 
 
Reviewed by Remus Valsan 
 
 
Fiduciary Duties: Directors and Employees by Andrew Stafford QC and Stuart Ritchie QC is 
an in-depth, comparative analysis of fiduciary duties owed by directors and employees under 
English law. Although the book focuses on fiduciary duties, it also covers the main 
contractual rights and remedies which may apply when a director or employee engages in 
misconduct. A large volume of caselaw and academic commentary on fiduciary duties has 
been produced since 2008, when the first edition was published. The new edition does a 
remarkable job in incorporating the most relevant legal developments and academic 
commentary on fiduciary duties. Most chapters comprise references to caselaw from across 
the Commonwealth, particularly from Australia and New Zealand, which, like English law, 
prefer a restrictive approach to fiduciary duties. The authors are careful in their use of the 
case law of other common law countries to inform their own critical evaluation of the English 
law. They highlight the areas where there are important differences between English and 
foreign (particularly Australian) law.  
 The integrated evaluation of the legal regime of fiduciary duties of directors and 
employees from both a theoretical and a practical perspective is one of the essential 
contributions that this book brings to fiduciary law. Analysing the two areas of fiduciary law 
side by side is a challenging task. Director-company is recognised throughout the 
Commonwealth as a status fiduciary relation, where fiduciary duties are almost inevitable. In 
contrast, employee-employer is generally viewed as an arms’ length contractual relation, 
where fiduciary duties arise only exceptionally, on an ad hoc basis. The comparison of these 
two relations focuses the analysis on the fundamental principles of fiduciary law. Stafford 
and Ritchie’s evaluation of these principles is, for the most part, very illuminating. For 
instance, their comparative approach shows why reliance on overly used formulas such as 
2 
 
loyalty or trust and confidence, without a further explanation of their meaning, perpetuates 
the confusion prevailing in this area of law. These concepts have a specific meaning in 
employment law that is not coterminous with their meaning in fiduciary theory.  
The comparison is also enlightening in its treatment of the grey area between the two 
strands of fiduciary law. Difficult questions have arisen in English law as regards the 
applicability by analogy of directors’ duties to executive directors, officers and other senior 
employees. This particular connexion has not been sufficiently explored in English law, and 
the book fills this gap.   
Stafford and Ritchie’s analysis is particularly rigorous and insightful in setting the 
boundaries between the fiduciary principle and related doctrines and duties. The authors 
acknowledge that the boundary between contractual and fiduciary liability is uncertain, but 
are careful to keep the fiduciary principle distinct from other bodies of law, most notably law 
of negligence and contract law (fair dealing issues in employment settings). They also 
rightfully keep fiduciary duties separate from obligations of confidentiality and the doctrine 
of undue influence.   
The authors favour a restrictive approach to the fiduciary principle in both its scope 
and content. In analysing the incidence of the fiduciary principle, the authors correctly 
observe that simply entrusting someone with a job to perform or someone’s undertaking to 
act for another does not make that person a fiduciary. They cite multiple British and 
Australian authorities, including the recent Australian decision in Grimaldi v Chameleon 
Mining Corp & Others,1 in support of the proposition that the core element that generates 
fiduciary duties is the reasonable expectations of one party that the other party will act 
exclusively in the former’s interests. Their conclusion on when fiduciary duties arise, 
however, is rather vague and lacks explanatory power. In their view, what distinguishes a 
fiduciary relation from an arms’ length commercial relation is the requirement for a party not 
to exploit the relationship for his own benefit and to be financially disinterested in the 
performance of his duties.      
In line with the traditional English and Australian approach, and in contrast to the 
North-American view, Stafford and Ritchie support the proscriptive view of fiduciary duties, 
which restricts the fiduciary label to the no-conflict and no-profit duties. This view is 
supported by perceptive explanations of why certain duties that often bind fiduciaries are not 
properly regarded as fiduciary duties. The duty of good faith is a telling example. Following 
                                                                 
1 [2012] 287 ALR 22. 
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Millet LJ’s statements in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew,2 where he listed good 
faith as a facet of the core obligation of loyalty, the duty of good faith is often regarded as 
fiduciary. The authors reject the broader approach, espoused especially by Canadian courts, 
but also by several English courts, that there is a prescriptive fiduciary duty of good faith. 
Good faith, although present in all fiduciary relations, is not a concept limited to them. The 
same applies to the duty to act within powers, which is not a peculiarly fiduciary duty. It is 
binding on any holder of a limited power.  
The analysis of disclosure obligations is very insightful and brings much needed 
clarification in this area of fiduciary law. The authors point out that there is a trend towards 
imposing obligations of disclosure on directors and employees. They review the different 
contexts in which disclosure obligations arise for directors and employees and the functions 
that these obligations have. They bring strong arguments against the fiduciary duty of 
disclosure imposed on directors in Item Software (UK) Limited v Fassihi3 and argue against 
an analogous duty for employees.   
While the authors bring convincing arguments in favour of a narrow approach to 
fiduciary duties, their definition of this concept, it is submitted, is too restrictive. Their 
understanding that fiduciary duties are limited to the principle of denial of self-interest led 
them to maintain that the duty comprised in s.172 of Companies Act 2006 is not a fiduciary 
duty. They seem to endorse the view that this duty is an exceptional duty of care that can 
exist outside fiduciary relations, has no direct relation to self-interest, and cannot be 
transplanted into a different fiduciary relationship.4 This view is contestable. Besides the fact 
that s.172 is widely considered to state the core fiduciary duty of directors,5 a similar duty 
exists for trustees and other fiduciaries. The duty to take into account relevant considerations 
and to ignore irrelevant ones while exercising discretion is not restricted to company 
directors. It is a fundamental duty that governs the exercise of discretion by all fiduciaries.6 
The Court of Appeal has recently recognised that in Pitt v Holt,7 where the Lloyd LJ stated 
                                                                 
2 [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
3 [2004] IRLR 928. 
4 Para. 2.59. 
5 The authors acknowledge this at para. 2.150. 
6 See Geraint Thomas, Thomas on Powers, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
555-558. 
7 Pitt and another v Holt and another; Futter and another v Futter and others [2011] 2 All 
ER 450 at 487. The Supreme Court upheld this decision as regards the matter of actions by 
trustees within the limits of their powers. Futter & Anor v The Commissioners for Her 
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that the trustees’ duty to take relevant matters into account is a fiduciary duty, so an act done 
as a result of a breach of that duty is voidable. The two components of fiduciary duties, 
namely the proscriptive duties and the duty to exercise discretion based on relevant matters 
are intimately connected. Recent research in fiduciary law theory shows that in relations 
where one party has discretionary power or authority over the other’s interests, the strict 
proscriptive duties are necessary to ensure that the exercise of discretion is not influenced, 
directly or subconsciously, by the prospect of self-interest.8     
Fiduciary Duties: Directors and Employees successfully balances an in-depth 
evaluation of core fiduciary law doctrinal debates with details relevant to practitioners who 
seek answers to concrete legal problems. The authors adopt a critical approach rather than a 
textbook exposition of the law. They state and explain their own view where the law is 
confusing or open to doubt. Their critical evaluation provide valuable insights for the further 











                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Pitt & Anor v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs [2013] UKSC 26. 
8 See Remus Valsan, “Understanding Fiduciary Duties: Conflict of Interest and Proper 
Exercise of Judgment in Private Law” (2012) McGill University Faculty of Law Doctoral 
Dissertation at 180-194.   
